来源：保尔森基金会

2018年11月7日，新加坡保尔森基金会主席、美国第74任财政部长亨利·保尔森在彭博创新经济论坛发表讲话。他的讲话主要涉及美中之间正在加剧的紧张局势。他在演讲中指出，如果两国不能达成一个可行共识以解决当前争端，会有经济铁幕降临世界经济的风险。下面是保尔森部长的演讲全文。

女士们，先生们，谢谢大家。

同时，请允许我对我的好朋友迈克·布隆伯格先生和这个新论坛的组织者表示感谢。

并感谢新加坡政府和人民对本论坛的支持，及更重要的，认识到在当前形势下坦诚前瞻性对话的重要性。

女士们，先生们，各方之间的对话在当前这个异常微妙的时刻尤其重要。

我们在新加坡的这次会议正逢一个变化，挑战甚至危机同时存在的时刻:

当下是一个世界经济充满变化的时刻。各种革命性技术创新层出不穷，同时前所未有的政治压力对全球产业链造成冲击。

当下是一个地缘政治挑战高发的时刻。由于美中关系降温，这在本地区尤其明显。

同时当下也是一个危机潜伏的时刻。从乌克兰顿巴斯到南中国海，大国之间的竞争激化并存在无意间演变为军事冲突的危险。

今天，本区域必须谨慎关注美中之间由良性竞争变为全面冷战的可能性。

01

我认为我们今天在新加坡讨论这些问题是再合适不过的。新加坡集中体现了亚洲之所以在过去半个世纪成为世界最成功案例的各种因素。

其中最重要的因素之一是新加坡强劲的经济基础。新加坡从1965年8月9日以来的几十年间一直确保了正确的经济政策环境。

第二是新加坡高质量的战略制定，例如隶属于新加坡总理办公室的未来战略中心——一个世界一流的战略规划机构。

第三是领导力。李光耀及吴庆瑞等领导人，自1965年以来几十年的领导是其他任何因素都无法替代的。

女士们，先生们，我个人认为，新加坡成功的最重要因素是其在民族，文化，语言和宗教各方面的多元性。

中，印，马来和其他各族裔在新加坡共同生活，工作和繁荣。

从闽南话到泰米尔语各种语言共存的局面展示了印太地区的多元性现实。

事实是这个区域极度复杂：

像新加坡一样，印太是一个多民族，多语言，历史多元化的地区。

多元性还体现在另一重要方面。在此，我希望我们把注意力从新加坡转向本区域的大国，特别是美国和中国。

印太地区的复杂性源于多种不同政治和经济体系的共处。

我们看到互相排斥的各种民族主义，关于历史的多元表达，截然不同的国家安全观念和不同的长期远景，竞相塑造本地区的未来。

在我看来，在这种多元和复杂的环境下，保持和平和确保繁荣不易。

李光耀明白这一点。

他曾经告诉我和其他许多人，他非常感谢美国在确保本地区和平和繁荣扮演的重要角色。

在他去世前和两位哈佛学者，Graham Allison 和 Robert Blackwill，做的访谈中，李先生以他惯有的直白指出：

“亚洲从开始有部落起就有强权政治。不管我们喜不喜欢，如果我们想作为独立个体生存下去，我们就必须在任何时刻都明白什么是所有国家的共同利益。”

我担心，现在在印太地区，我们正在快速遗忘李光耀的教导。

现在很少听到关于美中两国共同利益的说法。

这让我很担忧。

坦白的说，每个人都应该因此而担忧。

当前显然存在的是美中两国政府大量互相指责。

以我三十多年和中国打交道及美中关系方面的经验来看，这体现了当前局势的快速变化和战略关系正在发生根本转变。

我是一个美国爱国者。

因此，虽然我频繁访问中国，不常在家，但恰恰出于美国利益的考虑，我还是继续花大量时间寻求方法与这个新的，并有时很难相处的中国打交道。

我一直在这方面努力，也曾挣扎过，从我是投资银行家，到首席执行官，到美国财政部长，和现在一家致力于美中长期稳定经济合作机构的主席。

虽然有各种不顺利，紧张局势和不同意见，依我看来，解决美中关系各种问题的努力使美国收益很多。

我的朋友，王岐山副主席，过去两天和我们都在新加坡。在此全球金融危机十周年之际，回首我们在全球金融市场处于崩溃边缘的合作。

如果没有这种立场坚定但合作的关系，我可以确定的告诉你们，今天的世界经济和金融市场局面会大不一样。

我的中国同行们都知道我一贯说话直白，就如我在全球金融危机中所作一样。

因此今天我想本着积极建设性的精神讲一些我的看法。因为如果我们希望实现一个美好的未来，就必须审视过去和现在，即使难免严厉。

我想讲三个问题：

• 美中关系是如何到现在这个高度紧张局面的。
• 两国各自最大的风险因素。
• 关于如何促进长期美中关系稳定发展的个人看法。

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今天这个局面是如何产生的？

在我看来，目前恶化局势的诱因不复杂。

虽然我所讲的可能并不全面，但我认为它描述了美方情况的变化。

首先，美中利益渐行渐远：

在如朝鲜问题等很多美中应该有共同看法的问题上，美中经常采取不同的处理方案。

因此，共同利益并没有带来持续的合作。

更糟的是两国缺乏合作使许多人认为美中从来都不存在共同利益。

其次，美中对国际体系的一些重要规则无法达成共识。

一个例子就是由于对海权和航行规则的不同看法导致了两国军舰近期几乎相撞。

第三，美中在一些根本性问题上看法相反。

比如，我们两国在全球治理上的主张就截然不同。

例如，中俄两国主张互联网主权，并主张政府有权控制信息和跨境信息流动。美国和欧盟，尽管看法不完全一致，共同反对中俄在这方面的看法。

包括中国的互联网管理做法和南海在内的所有这些例子使得美国政界达成新的共识，即美中不但是竞争者，还很可能成为长期对手。

美国长期实行的对华”接触”政策现在被广泛认为其本身并没有太多价值。

没有人反对对话。

但几乎所有人都主张美中对话和接触并没有带来什么成果。

美中贸易战最终有可能很快会达成和解。

任何一方都不会从贸易战中获利。

中方可以接受特朗普总统足够多的要求，包括两国开始雄心勃勃的贸易或投资协议的谈判，以让他感到满意。

就算如此，我认为潜在的冲突仍将持续。

这是因为两国间存在大量问题和分歧，即使在经济领域，挑战也不仅仅局限于贸易问题。

除非这些涉及面更广和更深层次的问题得到解决，我们将面临两国关系的严冬。

首先讨论经济领域的问题。

美国在中国加入世界贸易组织领域一事上起到了决定性的作用。但在中国入世贸17年之后，在很多领域，中国还是没有对外资开放。

合资和股权比例的限制依然存在。

除此以外，在贸易和外商投资领域还有技术标准，政府补贴，办理许可证和管制等非关税壁垒。

在中国入世近20年还是这样，这是不可接受的。

这也就是为什么特朗普政府主张世界贸易组织需要与时俱进。我同意这个观点。

也正因如此，许多有影响力的人物主张美中两国经济”脱钩”，尤其是在科技相关的贸易和投资方面，而这些都会破坏现有的供应链。

这些主张不会很快消失。

基于这些主张，本届及未来美国政府将会采取一系列相关行动。

美国民主和共和两党在对中国问题上看法一致。

两党虽然在其他所有问题上看法都不一致，但对中国的负面看法高度一致。

对华贸易损害了部分美国工人的利益，他们已经通过选票表达了不满。

因此，尽管很多人都把对华关系转向归于特朗普政府，我不认同这个看法。

当前的趋势很可能会在美国政策制定界长期持续下去。

一个正在形成的共识是，中国不但对美国是个战略挑战，同时中国的崛起已经损害美国利益。

在这种环境下，如果能有更多的人支持美中关系是有帮助的。

现实并不如此，这反映了美中关系中的另一个失败。

由于中国入世后对外资开放速度不尽如人意，美国商界从过去对华关系支持者的角色变为对美国之前对华政策的怀疑甚至反对者。虽然美国商界并不想要贸易战，但他们想要美国政府对华手段更有对抗性。

是什么导致了那些对中国最了解，在中国工作，做生意，赚钱并长期支持两国富有成效的关系的群体现在反而支持更多对抗呢？

答案就是中国过去近二十年在公平竞争和对外开放方面进展缓慢。

这给美国商界带来了挫败感，并导致商界内部对华态度分裂。

商界的这种变化无疑进一步增强了美国政界和专家们对华看法负面化。

总之，虽然很多美国企业继续在中国盈利，越来越多的美国企业认为外企永远不可能在中国获得公平对待。

很多企业不得不接受浮士德式的交易，用接受对他们长期在华发展的种种限制，以换取今天的利益。

但这并不代表他们满意这种种限制。

同时，这些企业其实是非常明白中国政策环境给他们带来的风险，而且已经在努力发展中国以外的市场。

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但与此同时，外国企业在中国不能做的，中国企业可以在海外市场做。

这进一步加剧了潜在的紧张。

因此，我相信美国对华态度强硬化部分是由于中国对外资开放不足导致的。

在过去五年，在美国人的眼光里，中国政府发出的信号是这样的：

首先，共产党统领一切。

因此，党委，而不是公司董事会，作为加强外部监督的手段，在国有和民营企业中的作用都加强了。

其次，民营企业除了市场或商业考虑，还要支持政府的战略目标。

这也是为什么中国国企改革强调混合所有制，通过把民间和国有资本合在一起来支持和加强国有企业。

第三，很多领域”不需要”外资企业，同时外企需要帮助推进中国在技术，知识，商业流程等方面的自主化。

这一点在当前美中关系紧张局势中非常关键。

问题并不只是外国技术的对华转让和吸收。

而是中国通过自主创新对外国技术的加工使得他们变成了中国的技术。很多跨国公司的CEO都和我抱怨过这个问题，他们认为这对他们公司的核心研发和创新人员非常不公平。

中国试图通过”一带一路”等计划把中国的发展模式和各种标准推广到其他地区可能成为对抗升级的原因。

例如，大多数关于一带一路的报道都集中在港口，发电站和高速公路，而”数字一带一路”并不广为所知。通过”数字一带一路”，我先前提到导致美欧与中国关系紧张的中国的互联网治理模式将被介绍到其他国家。

同时，我也很了解中国决策者对美国政策也有很多不满。

美国政府也需要尽力解决这些使中方关心的问题。

比如，我不想看到在没有国家安全风险，尤其是能创造大量美国就业的情况下，美国政府否决中国企业在美投资。

但坦白的说，两国的政治情况已经发生了很大的变化。

就如中国领导人长期反对美国试图同化中国，我建议中国领导人也需要认识到美国内部情况的变化。

事实是，在目前的情况下，除非新的情况使当前美国对华政策的趋势被改变或让美国政府认为正在形成的对华政策共识是错误的，中国的要求不会得到满足。

美国人越来越相信中国是一个同一级别的竞争者，在推行有敌意的政策，并对美国构成战略挑战。

我之所以用这么严峻的语言形容目前的情况是因为我相信如果这个趋势继续下去，这会成为今后几年美国对华政策的基调。

当下的风险因素，不可低估。

如果我们退一步，纵观全局，假如美中战略竞争加剧，但这不会影响经济及日常生活。那以上的这些讨论都可以放到一边。

可不幸的是，我认为一个动荡的新时期会带来巨大的风险。

大略如下:

这是因为，在过去四十年，美中关系表现为四方面的融通：产品，资金，技术和人员。

在过去四十年中，两国间经济融通被认为有助于缓解国家安全竞争。

但是，客观的评估，这不但不成立，现实反而恰恰相反。

这种变化的关键促成因素之一是科技。

在当今的世界，科技不但是商业成功的重要一部分，同时也涉及到国家经济竞争力和安全。

换句话说，国家安全竞争正在广泛渗入到经济和商业之中。

进一步的，经济领域的紧张局势也已经到了一个临界点。

在四十年美中经济融通的背景下，两党有不少政治和意见领袖都在主张美中两国经济关系在上述四方面断然脱离。

随着对供应链被强行打断，尤其是涉及到敏感技术的，双边货物贸易，将会受到重大打击。

在美国全面收紧对中资的审查情况下，双边投资也将遇到严峻考验。

如果当前的趋势持续下去，我们要预料到一个很可能发生的情况。那就是由于美中两国互相排斥对方，全球创新生态系统一体化会崩溃。

一个正在形成的共识是中国正在通过一系列高科技领域自主创新方面的政策和战略来制定自己的技术标准并达到自力更生。因此，美国有一些人现在主张冷战式的全面对华技术封锁。

除此以外，窃取外国技术，通过合资在内一系列手段强制技术转移，不同的互联网治理理念和对跨国信息传播的管理，也都起了推波助澜的作用。

但是，创新和技术是不可能和商业竞争力分离的。

因此，技术的巴尔干化，即各国开发自己的技术及技术标准，将会进一步威胁全球创新及各国企业的竞争力。

同时，由于最近美国政府将可能会禁止中国学生在美国任何科技领域学习，人员交流，尤其是有才华的年轻学生，也可能停滞。

如果在货物，资金，技术和人员四方面的脱钩持续下去的话，我担心全球经济的一大部分将不再允许资金和货物的自由流动。

这也就是我为什么认为 “经济铁幕”有可能降临，即美中双方互相封闭并使经济全球化后退。

今天，中国仍然非常依赖全球资本，贸易，投资和外国技术。中国政府不愿如此，但这是一个非常实际的问题。

因此，对于 “脱钩”最强烈的呼吁实际上来自美国，在较小程度上来自欧洲，而不是来自中国。

但美国一些提倡美中”离婚”的人却忽视了一个问题：

当你真的是一对伴侣时，”离婚”会更容易。

但事实上，美中并不是一对伴侣。美中关系不仅涉及到两国。尤其是亚洲其他国家都有发言权。

因此，美国可以通过限制商品，资本，技术和人员流动来试图与中国离婚。但是，如果其他国家，特别是亚洲国家不想效仿呢？

在亚洲及其周边地区多年的工作经验教会了我：

我不认为任何一个亚洲国家能负担得起，甚至愿意与中国离婚。

这是由他们每日面对的地理，经济引力以及战略现实所决定的。

确实，世界各地的许多政府和企业都同意美方目前的担忧。有时，这些政府和企业正在寻求类似的政策和商业决策，特别是在外国投资的国家安全筛查方面。尤其一些西欧国家正在加强这方面的政策。

但是，这并不意味着所有人，即使是美国最亲密的盟友，都准备好了和中国”离婚”。虽然现在美国政府内外一些人希望如此。

相反，在我看来，中国的经济增长虽然放缓，依然是世界上增长最快的主要经济体之一，没有哪个国家会与如此重要的国家”离婚”。

因此，美国如果想要孤立中国，会面临自我孤立的风险。

举个例子来说，如果一个跨国公司决定要另设总部，他们既想要抓住中国经济增长的浪潮，又希望找到对与中国政府有商业往来的公司不那么敌视的地方，这个公司会如何决定?

拥有国际领先的一流跨国公司是美国最具竞争力的优势之一。如果美国无法与世界上包括中国在内的快速增长经济体正确建立联系，美国面临失去这一优势的风险。

坦率地说，去一体化是不可避免的，在一些方面甚至是必要的——尤其是在保护我们的国家安全方面。

但是，在所有美中融合问题上一概而论是绝对不符合美国的利益。

美中离婚对全球企业来说全无益处。

那些驱逐公司和国家的贸易政策也是如此。

美国政府近日在美国-墨西哥-加拿大的贸易协定中插入新条款，旨在阻碍甚至否决美国盟友通过贸易谈判打开中国市场，这正是让我担忧的。

包括中国在内的16个亚洲国家正在谈判区域全面经济伙伴关系(RCEP)协定，这些亚洲国家怎么可能在美国的要求下终止谈判，尤其考虑到美国退出了跨太平洋合作伙伴关系协定。

我认为他们不会。

相较于寻求专注于敏感和关键领域， 经过精心校准的去一体化，美国似乎在尝试全面性进行去一体化，

并且，通过像美墨加贸易协议新条款这样的举措，在很多人看来，美方试图瓦解中国对外经济关系的各个方面。

这有可能导致美国政府与盟友和合作伙伴产生新一轮的冲突- 若要改变中国的所作所为，美国所需要的正是这些盟友和伙伴的帮助。

女士们，先生们，这就是我所说的美国”自我孤立”。

04

但是要明确的是，如果中国希望避免美中关系失控，中国需要认真审视自己的一些选择和政策。

最重要的是，这意味着中国需要重新拾起以市场为主导的改革开放精神，这将解决长期以来存在的批评，同时也为中国经济带来利好。

今年是中国”改革开放”四十周年——在1978年的三中全会上， 由邓小平等领导人发起的重大转变。

这四十年来，中国蒸蒸日上。

尤其是自2001年加入世界贸易组织以来，中国更是日新月异。

中国的名义国内生产总值已由2001年的1万亿美元增长为13万亿美元的庞然大物。

其2200亿美元的外汇储备在这一时期迅速增长至惊人的3万亿美元，其中一些目前正投入海外直接投资和收购。

但是，特别是在过去的十五年中，中国失去了改革开放的大胆精神。这种精神让朱镕基这样的领导人在20世纪90年代对国有企业主导的行业进行了重大改革，为中国加入世贸组织做好准备。

朱镕基将竞争视为中国长期经济成功的关键。

在那些日子里，中国的未来似乎与世界有着千丝万缕的联系。

但今天，在美国的普遍观点是，中国越来越满足于追求本土标准，强化本土规则，竖起而非推倒外国竞争者所面临的阻碍。

因此，我一如既往地鼓励中国领导人进行改革， 尤其关注以下三个方面：

首先是竞争政策改革。

准许外国公司在公平的竞争环境中与中国公司竞争。

就此而言，中国民营企业也应该被准许以同样的方式与国有企业竞争。

第二个领域涉及市场的作用。

我曾是一名投资银行家，与五大洲数十个国的数百家公司合作。我认识到：成功的公司是作为商业公司经营的，而不是作为国家的代理人。

这些企业让市场主导关键决策。

他们回应市场信号，而非政府信号。

当然，中国将始终拥有庞大的国有产业。

因此，中国应该推进这些支柱产业，支持包括国有企业在内的所有企业进行商业化运行。

这意味着加强公司董事会，而不是党委作为外部监督的工具。

这也意味着允许最优秀的管理人员作为真正的管理者来运营公司。

与此同时，不管是国有还是私有企业，所有企业一律商业运营也将有助于为外国公司提供公平的竞争环境。

第三，中国必须培育和保护创新。

强制性技术转让政策需要退出。中国应努力防止网络盗窃，更好地保护知识产权。不应借助自主创新规定，包括使用本土标准等，来限制竞争。

所以中国需要做出一个重要决定。

避免经济铁幕的关键是让中国明确认识到这些改革和变化将为自己带来益处。

如果中国不迅速行动，我怀疑对美中离婚的呼声将会加剧。

这一番话让我并不好受。

在过去的四十年间，两国达成了一种美中双边关系，然而现在，我们显然面临着过渡到一个新型关系的艰巨任务。这个新的双边关系要扎根于更为实际，更可持续的战略框架。在这一个时间点上，美中离婚是一个很现实的风险。

05

女士们，先生们，我认为目前美中关系的前景并非轻易可以扭转。

这由来已久。

美中关系的重大结构性变化是不可避免的——在现在的这个时间点上也是非常需要的。

这个问题并没有简单的答案。然而任何有价值的问题都从来艰难。

作为第一要务，为了两国和世界的福祉，我们必须阻止恶化的趋势。

但要做到这一点，有识之士要做出一些艰难的决定。

为促进这样的决策，我先行为双方提供以下一些建议：

对中国的建议：

首先，不要造成伤害。

例如，实行强有力的管理准则，以防止类似上月解放军海军在南中国海与美国海军近乎发生碰撞的行为。

第二，与美国的盟友和伙伴建设性地合作。

近年来，中国与日本，印度，韩国或菲律宾的关系严重恶化，这些压力也影响到美中关系。不再可能将美中关系与中国在亚洲的态势分开。

第三，要大胆。开放你的经济。相信你的公司可以竞争，不再需要躲在政府保护墙后面。

正如我已经说过的，我相信这种竞争对中国也有好处。

第四，积极主动地保护外国专有技术，终止直接或间接的强制性技术转让政策。

第五，在美国最重要的战略问题上与其合作，尤其是朝鲜问题。

令我感到遗憾的是，朝鲜去核化的问题上，美中显然有很多共同利益，然而近年来双方的做法频频背道而驰。

对美国的建议：

首先，弱化激烈的言辞。

战略竞争是一个事实。

美中两国的国家利益存在巨大差异。

我们对于国家安全的观念显然存在冲突，尤其是在南中国海。

但中国并没有对美国文明构成存在性威胁。在美国伟大的民主实验的第242年，我们应该对自己国家和制度的韧劲更有信心。

我们应该对中国带来的显著战略挑战做好准备。但在面对挑战的同时，我们不应牺牲自己的价值观和保持开放的承诺。这些观念使我们成为世界上最强大，最具竞争力和最受尊敬的国家。

第二，争取合作伙伴。然后，与这些合作伙伴联盟，努力与北京建立一些可行的共识。

中国的政治和经济制度与我们不同。所以这一任务并不容易——也从来都不容易。

但是，虽然中国不支持自由主义秩序，它确实需要一个有效的全球秩序，就像我们一样。

因此，我们仍应深入研究中国是否有意愿确保我们所依赖的机构能够更为高效地应对当今紧迫问题。

世界贸易组织也许是最好的例子。

世界贸易组织迫切需要改革升级。

难道中国和美国不应成为引领世界贸易组织进入数字时代的主要动力吗？

在新加坡，你们理解亚洲事务归根结底在于商业。

因此，虽然美国的贸易和投资政策确实需要一个新的方向，但我完全不能理解特朗普政府拒绝那些能够使亚洲贸易架构更为强健有效的方案。

坦率来讲，我希望特朗普总统重新考虑退出跨太平洋伙伴关系(TPP)的决定。

TPP 2.0将提供现成的工具来塑造中方所处的贸易环境。

第三，与中国谈判。

当你进行谈判时，要有明确的目标。

这意味着找到框架不仅来讨论问题，还要解决问题。

如果想要解决这些问题，我们几乎必然要与志同道合的合作伙伴密切合作。例如，为什么不与中国签订多方投资协议——携手拒绝美国，欧盟和日本的市场准入并不是目的本身，而是作为与中国政府结构性谈判的一部分，旨在测试是否能开放中国市场，并且设立明确的激励措施和有效的抑制手段？

第四，在任何情况下，加大力度投资美国。

一个强大的军队。

一个强劲的经济。

强有力的教育机构。

对科学和工程的大力投资。

对世界开放。

投资盟友。

投资各大洲安全和经济伙伴关系，特别是在亚洲和欧洲。

如果美国要在21世纪的世界中竞争和繁荣，这些措施至关重要。

没有什么能取代做好自己的政策规划。

女士们，先生们，如果美国要与中国巧妙地竞争，这才是最重要的因素——通过利好而非恐惧，信心而非胆怯，不论是今天还是将来。

毫无疑问，我认为美国如何与中国打交道，中国如何应对美国，将塑造本世纪的地缘政治格局。

美中战略互动是世界上最具影响力的。

今日美中关系的前景让我十分警醒。

从根本上来讲，我认为它可能威胁整个国际体系的运行。

作为财政部长，我主导应对美国2008年的金融危机，所以我对系统性风险略知一二。美中两国占全球国内生产总值的40％和全球增长的50％，当这两个国家目的相悖，试图使两个经济体互相脱离，并且在每个节点挑战基于规则的国际秩序的根基，我完全无法看到国际体系如何持续下去。

确实，华盛顿和北京并不总是利益共通。但是，在可能决定全球经济成败的各种实际问题上，他们仍然需要以互补的方式开展工作。或者如果不这样做，他们需要应对并尝试减轻双方矛盾的后果。

如果美国和中国无法达成可行的共识，这将构成一个巨大的系统性风险，不仅仅威胁我所应对的全球经济，更会波及现存的国际秩序和世界和平。

两国都需要一个切实可行的国际体系——因为国际秩序是那些大到不能倒的事物之一。任何其他的方案都是不可接受的。

这就是为什么我希望政治韬略能够胜出。

现在，我们正在沿着不同的路径前进，并且我们面临着一个漫长冬天的危险，然后才能迎来一个仍旧零落的春天。但我相信春天终会到来。所以问题是，这个冬天会持续多长时间，以及沿途会造成多少不必要的秩序混乱和痛楚？

答案将取决于美中两国领导人的能力和意愿进行创造性思考——有时甚至是破坏性创新思考。

1972年，我们两国的领导人为围困在冷战和意识形态冲突之中的世界创造了一个初步框架。

在其后的不同阶段，他们不得不重新校准。

今天的世界与20世纪70年代或者21世纪初的世界大为不同，甚至与我的朋友王岐山和我应对金融危机的那些年也天差地别。

新技术，新的经济挑战，新的地缘政治挑战——所有这些都削弱了过去的框架。

所以我们达到了另一个举足轻重的时刻。

对我们的经济和世界而言，其中利害比历史上任何时候都更为重大。

我们需要制定一个新框架，适用于今天的世界，而不是过去。

为此，我们需要政治韬略——来自美国和中国明智而有力的领导。

谢谢。

附：

REMARKS BY HANK PAULSON ON U.S. AND CHINA AT A CROSSROADS

Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Paulson Institute Chairman and 74th Secretary of the Treasury, today addressed the Bloomberg New Economy Forum, during which he focused on the growing tension between the United States and China and the risk of an Economic Iron Curtain forming in the global economy if the two countries do not move past their disputes toward a workable consensus.

Below are Secretary Paulson’s prepared remarks.

Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you.

And let me also thank my good friend Mike Bloomberg and the organizers of this new forum.

And a very special thank you to the government and people of Singapore—for playing host, of course, but, above all, for recognizing the importance of having a candid and forward-looking conversation now.

And Ladies and Gentlemen, it is especially important to do so now because we have arrived at an unusually delicate moment in time.

We are meeting here in Singapore at a moment of change, challenge, and potentially even crisis:

It is a moment of change in the global economy — as world-changing innovations are being developed but against the backdrop of unprecedented political pressure on cross-national supply chains.

It is a moment of challenge in geopolitics, particularly in this part of the world — as the US-China relationship comes unstuck.

And yes, it is a moment of potential crisis — as great power competition surges and the threat of stumbling into an armed conflict looms from the Donbass to the South China Sea.

Today, this region must look warily at the prospect that what, until now, has been a healthy strategic competition will tip into a full-blown cold war.

Now, it is fitting, I think, that we discuss these developments in Singapore—a place that reflects so much of what has made Asia the world’s greatest success story of the last half century.

One piece of that puzzle is Singapore’s strong economic fundamentals. Singapore did much in the decades after August 9, 1965, to get its economic policy environment right.

A second is this country’s solid strategic planning—something exemplified by the existence of a best-in-class strategic planning unit, the Centre for Strategic Futures, right inside the Prime Minister’s Office.

A third piece is leadership. And there is simply no substitute for the kind of leadership shown in the decades after 1965 by Lee Kuan Yew, and colleagues such as Goh Keng Swee.

Yet for me, Ladies and Gentlemen, perhaps the greatest ingredient of Singapore’s success is its diversity—ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious.

Chinese, Indians, Malays, and so many others live, work, and flourish together here in Singapore.

And that diversity, expressed in the lyrical sounds of ancient languages from Hokkien to Tamil, reflects the reality of the Indo-Pacific itself.

The fact is, this is an enormously complex region: Like Singapore, the Indo-Pacific is ethnically, linguistically, and historically diverse.

But it is diverse in another important sense as well—and here, I want to lift our gaze beyond Singapore to the region’s big powers, and especially the United States and China.

The Indo-Pacific is complex because so many different political and economic systems co-exist.

We see contending nationalisms, diverse national narratives, distinctive security concepts, and different visions all jockeying to shape this region’s future.

And let me tell you, it is no easy thing to keep the peace and assure prosperity in such a diverse and complex region.

Lee Kuan Yew understood that.

And he told me, and many others, that he was grateful to America for playing the key role in doing just that.

In a series of interviews he gave to the Harvard scholars, Graham Allison and Robert Blackwill, before his death, Mr. Lee put this point with his characteristic bluntness:

“Power politics in Asia,” he said, “is as old as the first tribes that emerged … [And] whether we like it or not, if we are to survive and maintain our separate identities, it is necessary that we should learn what is in the joint interest at any single time of a group of nations.”

But I fear that now—right here in the Indo-Pacific—we are quickly unlearning Mr. Lee’s lesson.

You don’t hear much about “joint” interests between the United States and China anymore.

That worries me.

And frankly, it should worry all of us.

There’s obviously a lot of finger pointing between Beijing and Washington these days.

But what I must say—as a practitioner, who has been involved with China and US-China relations for some three decades—is that this reflects rapid change and the emergence of a very different strategic dynamic.

I am an American patriot.

And so I find myself spending more time in China than my family would like precisely because it is in America’s interest to find a way to deal with this new, and sometimes difficult, China.

I have strived, and sometimes struggled, to do that:

As an investment banker.

As a CEO.

As America’s Treasury Secretary.

And today, as the leader of an institute dedicated to sustainable economic cooperation between the United States and China.

And yet for all the struggles, for all the tension, for all the disagreement, America has been well served, in my view, by the effort to work through problems.

My friend, Vice President Wang Qishan, has been here with us in Singapore over the last two days. And in this 10th anniversary year of the 2008 financial crisis, I look back at our work together—when global markets were on the brink of collapse—as an example of tough-minded but cooperative interaction.

Without this, I can assure you that the markets and our economies would look significantly different today.

Indeed, my colleagues in China know that I speak my mind, often bluntly—much as I did during the financial crisis.

So today, I am going to offer some thoughts in a constructive spirit, because it is necessary to judge the past and present—sometimes harshly—if we are to try for a better future.

What I’d like to do with these remarks is to talk about three things:

• How the United States and China arrived at this moment of heightened tension;
• The most acute risks I see for each side;
• A few modest suggestions of the kinds of steps necessary to begin the long process of setting US-China relations onto a more sustainable footing.

How Did We Get Here

The drivers of the current downward spiral aren’t, in my view, necessarily complicated.

And while my version of the story isn’t, of course, the whole story, it reflects, I believe, what has happened on the American side.

First, we have diverging interests:

On many issues where the United States and China should agree, such as North Korea, we too often pursue divergent approaches.

That means that common interests haven’t yielded enduring cooperation.

Worse, our lack of sufficient cooperation has persuaded many people that we never shared an interest in the first place.

Second, the United States and China disagree about some important rules governing the international system.

One example is maritime rights and customs—a disagreement that recently brought our navies into a near-collision on the high seas.

Third, American and Chinese views are, quite simply, opposed in some critical areas.

On some issues, we advocate vastly different ideas for international governance.

For example, China and Russia argue for cyber sovereignty and the right of the state to control data and cross-border data flows. The US and the EU, while not in perfect agreement with one another, both reject those Chinese and Russian views.

Taken together, these and other drivers, such as China’s cyber practices and island building in the South China Sea, have fueled a new consensus in Washington that China is not just a strategic competitor but very possibly our major long-term adversary.

America’s longstanding “engagement” policy is now widely viewed as being of little use for its own sake.

Nobody is arguing against dialogue.

But nearly everybody is arguing that the results of US-China dialogue and engagement have been poor.

The tariff war between the US and China will eventually be concluded—hopefully soon.

Nobody wins a trade war.

And China can agree to enough of what President Trump seeks to enable a deal that he can be proud of – if it also marks the beginning of the negotiation of a high-ambition trade or investment agreement.

But I also happen to believe that the underlying tensions will persist.

That is because the problems we face, and our divergence of views, even in the economic area, is much broader.

Unless these broader and deeper issues are addressed, we are in for a long winter in US-China relations.

The Economics

The United States played the decisive role in facilitating China’s entry into the World Trade Organization. Yet 17 years after China entered the WTO, China still has not opened its economy to foreign competition in so many areas.

It retains joint venture requirements and ownership limits.

And it uses technical standards, subsidies, licensing procedures, and regulation as non-tariff barriers to trade and investment.

Nearly 20 years after entering the WTO, this is simply unacceptable.

It is why the Trump Administration has argued that the WTO system needs to be modernized and changed. And I agree.

But it also helps explain why so many influential voices now argue for a “decoupling” of the two economies, especially with respect to technology-related trade and investment that will disrupt supply chains.

These arguments will not go away anytime soon.

They will drive a variety of new approaches from this administration and its successors.

Both Democrats and Republicans are saying so.

And this negative view of China unites politicians from both left and right who agree on nothing else.

Trade with China has hurt some American workers. And they have expressed their grievances at the ballot box.

So while many attribute this shift to the Trump Administration, I do not.

What we are now seeing will likely endure for some time within the American policy establishment.

China is viewed—by a growing consensus—not just as a strategic challenge to the United States but as a country whose rise has come at America’s expense.

In this environment, it would be helpful if the US-China relationship had more advocates.

That it does not reflects another failure:

In large part because China has been slow to open its economy since it joined the WTO, the American business community has turned from advocate to skeptic and even opponent of past US policies toward China. American business doesn’t want a tariff war but it does want a more aggressive approach from our government.

How can it be that those who know China best, work there, do business there, make money there, and have advocated for productive relations in the past, are among those now arguing for more confrontation?

The answer lies in the story of stalled competition policy, and the slow pace of opening, over nearly two decades.

This has discouraged and fragmented the American business community.

And it has reinforced the negative attitudinal shift among our political and expert classes.

In short, even though many American businesses continue to prosper in China, a growing number of firms have given up hope that the playing field will ever be level.

Some have accepted the Faustian bargain of maximizing today’s earnings per share while operating under restrictions that jeopardize their future competitiveness.

But that doesn’t mean they’re happy about it.

Nor does it mean they aren’t acutely aware of the risks — or thinking harder than ever before about how to diversify their risks away from, and beyond, China.

Meanwhile, Chinese firms are permitted to operate in other countries in ways that foreign firms cannot act in China itself.

That exacerbates these underlying tensions.

And so I do believe that China’s actions and failure to open up have contributed to this more confrontational view in the United States.

The messages from Beijing over the last five years sound this way to American ears:

First, the Communist Party commands all.

That is why, for example, Party Committees, not corporate boards, are being strengthened within both public and private firms as a tool of external supervision.

Second, private businesses must support the strategic goals of the state, not necessarily market or commercial goals.

That is why the emphasis in China’s state-owned enterprise “reforms” has been on mixed ownership — pooling private with state capital to buttress and strengthen the state-owned firms.

Third, foreign firms are “not needed” in many areas and must act in ways that bolster China’s indigenization of technology, knowledge, and business processes.

And this third apparent message is absolutely central to the current intensification of US-China tensions.

It is not just that foreign technologies are being transferred and digested.

It is that they are being reworked so that foreign technologies become Chinese technologies through an indigenization process that many of the multinational CEOs I talk to believe is grossly unfair to the innovators and dreamers at the heart of their companies.

And this may now become a source of heightened confrontation as China exports aspects of its model—and its standards—through initiatives like the Belt and Road.

For example, while most of the headlines about the Belt and Road focus on ports, power generation, and highways, the unsung story may be the “Digital Silk Road,” an initiative that could export China’s model of cyber-governance — the very model that I earlier mentioned as a source of tension with the US and the EU.

Now, as I said, I know quite well that Chinese decision-makers have their own long list of grievances and concerns with US policy.

Washington has work to do to address some of these Chinese concerns.

For instance, I don’t like to see Chinese investments in our country turned down when there is no national security risk, especially when these will create American jobs.

But frankly, the political context has changed dramatically in both capitals.

So just as Chinese policymakers tell Americans to stop trying to make China into something that it isn’t, I encourage Chinese decision-makers to recognize the changed context in the United States.

The fact is, Beijing’s “asks” cannot be addressed in this new context unless something happens to shake the current trajectory or raise questions in Washington about the wisdom of the emerging consensus I have described.

Americans increasingly believe China is a peer competitor, pursuing adversarial policies, and a major strategic challenge.

And I am describing this to you in stark terms because I believe that, if we stay on this trajectory, it will comprise the context of US policy for years to come.

The Risks

So, that brings us to the risks.

And they are considerable.

It would be easy to step back from all this and conclude that, while we face an intensification of strategic competition, it does not disrupt our economies wholesale, much less our daily lives.

But sadly, I think the risks of a new age of disruption are considerable.

Here’s the nub of it:

For forty years, the US-China relationship has been characterized by the integration of four things—goods, capital, technology, and people.

And over these forty years, economic integration between the two countries was supposed to mitigate security competition.

But an intellectually honest appraisal must now admit both that this hasn’t happened and that the reverse is taking place:

And technology is a critical driver of this change.

In today’s world, technology is a critical part of business success, blurring the lines between economic competitiveness and national security.

Security competition is bleeding extensively into economics and business.

And more than that, economic tensions are reaching a breaking point.

The result is that, after forty years of integration, a surprising number of political and thought leaders on both sides advocate policies that could forcibly de-integrate the two countries across all four of these baskets.

The integration of trade in goods could come undone — as supply chains are forcibly broken, especially for those that use sensitive technology.

Integration through cross-border capital flows will come under ever greater pressure — as restrictions on Chinese investment take hold across big sectors in the United States.

Indeed, if this trend continues, we need to consider the possibility that the integration of global innovation ecosystems will collapse as a result of mutual efforts by the United States and China to exclude one another.

Some in the United States now advocate a Cold War-style technology denial regime. And this is partly because of a growing consensus that China has been using policies and strategies that foster the indigenous development of high technology to set its own standards and, ultimately, pursue self-reliance.

Pervasive technology theft, forced technology transfer, including within joint ventures, and different models of internet governance and cross-border data flows are also contributing factors.

Yet innovation and technology cannot be separated from business competitiveness.

So, such a balkanization of technology could further harm global innovation, not to mention the competitiveness of firms around the world.

Meanwhile, the integration of people, especially the brightest young students, could also stall — as Washington potentially bans Chinese students from studying whole categories of science and engineering subjects.

If all this persists—across all four baskets of goods, capital, technology, and people—I fear that big parts of the global economy will ultimately be closed off to the free flow of investment and trade.

And that is why I now see the prospect of an Economic Iron Curtain—one that throws up new walls on each side and unmakes the global economy, as we have known it.

Now, as a practical matter, rather than an aspirational one, China still relies a lot on global capital, trade, investment, and foreign know-how.

And so the most strident calls for “decoupling” are actually coming from the United States and, to a lesser extent, from Europe, not from China.

But here’s the problem for those in my country who advocate a US-China “divorce”:

“Decoupling” is easier when you’re actually a couple.

But the United States and China are not, in fact, a couple. There are more than two players here. And the rest of Asia, in particular, gets a vote.

So the US can try to divorce China by restricting flows of goods, capital, technology, and people. But what if others, especially in Asia don’t want to follow suit?

Many years of working in and around Asia have taught me this:

I do not believe that any country in Asia can afford to divorce China, or even wishes to.

That is a function of their geography, of economic gravity, and of the strategic reality they live with each and every day.

It is true that many governments and businesses around the world share Washington’s current concerns. And sometimes, these governments and businesses are pursuing similar policy and business choices, particularly with regard to investment screening for national security risk, which is being bolstered in a number of countries, especially in Western Europe.

But let us not presume this also means that everyone, including America’s closest allies, is ready to “divorce” China, as some in Washington would now have it.

On the contrary, no country, in my view, will “divorce” a major nation that remains, even amid a slowdown, among the world’s fastest growing major economies.

So in its effort to isolate China, the United States risks isolating itself.

Consider what would happen, for instance, if multinational companies decided that they should be headquartered somewhere else — still aiming to ride the wave of a growing Chinese economy but in a country less hostile to their doing business with Beijing.

Hosting scores of leading, best-in-class multinational corporations is among America’s greatest competitive strengths. And it is one that America now risks surrendering — if it cannot get right its links with the world’s fastest-growing economies, including China’s.

Frankly, de-integration is inevitable, and even necessary, in some areas—not least to protect our national security.

But it is decidedly not in America’s interest to attempt this across the board.

Divorce doesn’t work well for global businesses.

And the same could be said for the trade policies that drive companies and countries away.

This is exactly what worries me about the new clause Washington inserted into the recent US-Mexico-Canada trade agreement, which aims to short-circuit or even veto efforts by America’s partners to open China’s market through their own trade negotiations.

Why would Asian countries, which are negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, among a group of 16 that includes China, walk away from their negotiation at the behest of the country that pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership?

I presume they will not.

So instead of pursuing a carefully calibrated de-integration—focused on sensitive and critical areas—the US seems instead to be flirting with a comprehensive de-integration.

And through initiatives like that new trade clause, Washington now strikes many people as attempting to disrupt all aspects of China’s external economic relationships.

This risks setting Washington up for a new round of battles with its allies and partners—the very partners it needs to help alter Chinese behavior.

And this, Ladies and Gentlemen, is what I mean by American “self-isolation.”

But let us also be clear that if China wants to keep its relationship with the United States from spinning out of control, it is going to have to look hard at some of its choices and policies.

Above all, that means China will need to rediscover the spirit of market driven reform and opening up, which would address longstanding criticisms while doing wonders for the Chinese economy too.

This year marks the fortieth anniversary of “reform and opening” in China — the remarkable transformation launched by Deng Xiaoping and other leaders at the Third Plenum in 1978.

It’s been a good run for China over these forty years.

And it’s been an especially good run for China since it entered the WTO in 2001.

Its $1 trillion economy in 2001 has become a $13 trillion behemoth, measured in nominal GDP.

Its $220 billion in foreign exchange reserves has ballooned over the same period to a staggering $3 trillion, some of which is now being plowed into direct investments and acquisitions overseas.

But what China has lost, especially over the last decade-and-a-half, is the bold impulse to reform and open up that led leaders like Zhu Rongji to undertake significant changes to the state-led sector in the 1990s, as Beijing prepared for its WTO accession.

Zhu Rongji saw competition as a key to China’s long-term economic success.

In those days, China’s future seemed inextricably linked to the world’s.

But today, the prevailing view in the US is that China is increasingly content to pursue its own standards, privilege its domestic rules, and erect rather than demolish walls for foreign competitors.

And so I continue to encourage China’s leaders to pursue reforms in three baskets, in particular:

The first is competition reforms.

Foreign firms need to be allowed to compete with Chinese firms on a level playing field.

And for that matter, Chinese private firms should be allowed to compete with state firms in the same way.

The second area involves the role of the market.

As an investment banker, I worked with hundreds of firms in dozens of countries on five continents. And I learned this: the firms that succeed are run as commercial firms, not as agents of the state.

They allow the market to drive key decisions.

And they respond to market, not government, signals.

China will always have a large state-owned sector, of course.

So China should strengthen those pillars that permit firms—yes, even the state-owned firms—to be run commercially.

That means strengthening corporate boards, not Communist Party Committees, as the tool of external supervision.

And it means allowing top-flight managers to run these firms as real managers.

And by the way, running all firms, state and private, as commercial firms will help level the playing field for foreign firms too.

Third, China must foster and protect innovation.

Policies of forced technology transfer should end. China should work to prevent cyber-theft, and better protect intellectual property. And a mandate for indigenous innovation should not be used to limit competition, including through the use of standards.

And so China has an important decision to make.

The key to avoiding an Economic Iron Curtain is for China to see its interest clear in making these kinds of reforms and changes.

If China doesn’t move quickly, I suspect the calls for divorce will intensify.

And it pains me to say that.

But at this point, after forty years, when we have had one kind of relationship but now, quite clearly, face the daunting task of transitioning to a new one – anchored in a realistic and more sustainable – strategic framework – divorce is a real risk.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I don’t believe the current trajectory can be easily reversed.

It has been a long time coming.

Big structural changes to US-China relations were inevitable — and at this point are definitely desirable.

There aren’t easy answers. But, then, nothing worthwhile is ever easy.

As a first priority, it is essential that we alter the downward spiral, for the well-being of our nations and the world.

But to do so will require thoughtful people to make some tough decisions.

To get things started, I offer these considerations for both sides:

For China

First, do no harm.

For example, implement robust rules of engagement to prevent PLA Navy captains from the kind of maneuver that nearly resulted in a collision in the South China Sea last month.

Second, work constructively with America’s allies and partners.

In recent years, when China’s relations with Japan, or India, or South Korea, or the Philippines have taken a serious downturn, those pressures have bled into US-China relations too. It is no longer possible to separate US-China relations from China’s posture in Asia.

Third, be bold. Open your economy. Have confidence that your firms can compete, and no longer need to hide behind a wall of government protection.

And as I have already said, I believe this kind of competition would be good for China too.

Fourth, be proactive in protecting proprietary foreign know-how and end policies that directly or indirectly compel technology transfer.

Fifth, work with the US on its topmost strategic priorities, especially North Korea.

It is sad to me that in an area like that, where the US and China so clearly should share an interest in denuclearization, we too often have appeared to be working at cross-purposes in recent years.

For the United States

First, dial down the rhetoric.

Strategic competition is a fact.

We have compelling differences of national interest between our two countries.

And we clearly have clashing security concepts, not least in the South China Sea.

But China does not pose an existential threat to American civilization. In the 242nd year of our great democratic experiment, we should have more confidence in America and the resilience of our system.

We should prepare for the obvious strategic challenges from China. But in doing so, let’s not sacrifice those values—or the commitment to openness—that has made us the strongest, most competitive, and most admired country in the world.

Second, enlist partners. And then, working in coalition with these partners, try to foster some workable understandings with Beijing.

China has a different political and economic system. So this isn’t easy – and it never has been.

But while China doesn’t support a liberal order, it does need a functioning global order, just as we do.

Therefore, we should still be working hard to see if China is prepared to help ensure that the institutions we rely on can be made more effective to deal with today’s pressing problems.

The World Trade Organization is perhaps the best example.

It is in desperate need of an upgrade.

So why shouldn’t China and the United States be part of leading efforts to bring the WTO into the digital age?

Here in Singapore, you know that the business of Asia is business.

And so while it is true that American trade and investment policies surely needed a new direction, I simply do not understand the Trump Administration’s rejection of approaches that would align the trade architecture in Asia more compellingly.

To be blunt about this, I wish President Trump would reconsider his decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

A TPP 2.0 would offer a ready-made vehicle to shape the trade environment in which Beijing operates.

Third, negotiate with China.

And when you negotiate, do so with clear objectives.

That means finding frameworks not just to discuss issues but resolve them.

And resolving them almost certainly means working in closer coordination with like-minded partners. For instance, why not pursue a multi-party investment agreement with China — jointly withholding access to the US, EU, and Japanese markets, not as an end in itself but instead as part of a structured negotiation with Beijing that aims to test the prospect for opening there with clear incentives and strong disincentives?

Fourth, and under any scenario, invest in America—big time.

A strong military.

A strong economy.

Strong educational institutions.

Strong investments in science and engineering.

Openness to the world.

Investment in alliances.

Investment in security and economic partnerships on every continent, but especially in Asia and Europe.

These things are essential if the United States is to compete and thrive in the world of the 21st century.

There is simply no substitute for getting our own policies right.

And that, Ladies and Gentlemen, is the most essential ingredient if America is to compete with China smartly, now and into the future — with favor not fear, with confidence not caution.

There is no doubt in my mind that how the United States deals with China, and how they deal with us, will shape the geopolitical landscape for this century.

The US-China strategic interaction is by far the most consequential in the world.

I am very sobered by the trajectory we are on now.

And ultimately, I think it could pose a risk to the very functioning of the international system.

As Treasury Secretary, I presided over the US response to the 2008 financial crisis, so I know a little something about systemic risk. And I simply cannot see how the international system can endure when the two countries that comprise some 40 percent of global GDP and over 50 percent of global growth are working at cross purposes, attempting to de-integrate their two economies, and contesting the foundations of a rules-based order at every turn.

No, Washington and Beijing don’t always share interests. But on a variety of functional issues that can make or break the global economy, they still need to work in complementary ways. Or failing that, they need to manage and attempt to mitigate the consequences of their disputes.

If the US and China cannot find a way to develop a workable consensus, it will pose a systemic risk of monumental proportions — not just to the global economy, as I dealt with, but to international order as we know it and to world peace.

Both countries need an international system that functions – because international order is one of those things that is simply too big to fail. And so the alternative is unacceptable.

And that is why I am hopeful that statesmanship will prevail.

Right now, we are proceeding down divergent paths and we are in danger of facing a long winter before we reach what may still be a rather patchy spring. But I believe a spring will come. So the questions are, how long will this winter last, and how much unnecessary dysfunction and pain will be inflicted along the way?

The answer will be determined by the capacity and willingness of leaders in Washington and Beijing to think creatively – and sometimes even disruptively.

In 1972, our leaders established an initial framework for a world beset by Cold War and locked into an ideological conflict.

At various points along the way, they have had to recalibrate.

Today’s world looks nothing like the world of the 1970s, or of the 2000s, or even of the years when my friend, Wang Qishan, and I tackled the financial crisis.

New technologies, new economic challenges, new geopolitical challenges – all of these have eroded the frameworks of the past.

And so we’ve reached another of those consequential moments.

And the stakes—for our economies, and for the world—are higher than ever before.

We need to craft a new framework that works for today’s world, not the world of the past.

And for that, we will need statesmanship—wise and strong leadership in Washington and Beijing.

Thank you.